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Eleanor Neff PowellLetters & Science Nancy Obin Sukenik Professor
Associate Professor of Political Science University of Wisconsin-Madison |
Eleanor Neff Powell is an Associate Professor of Political Science and holds the Letters & Science Nancy Obin Sukenik Professorship at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Powell received her A.B. from Princeton University, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and previously served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. She is a scholar of American politics with focuses on the United States Congress, political parties and the influence of money in American politics. While her primary research interests lie in American politics, she has secondary research interests in Comparative Politics and Political Methodology. Her research has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, the British Journal of Political Science, and Political Science Research and Methods among other journals. Previously, she's served as President of the Midwest Political Science Association, Program Co-Chair of the MPSA, and as a co-founder of Women in Legislative Studies.
Recent Publications
1. "How Shifting Priorities and Capacity Affect Policy Work and Constituency Service: Evidence from a Census of Legislator Requests to U.S. Federal Agencies" (joint with Devin-Judge Lord and Justin Grimmer, forthcoming American Journal of Political Science)
Abstract: When elected officials gain power, do they use it to provide more constituent service or affect policy? The answer informs debates over how legislator capacity, term limits, and institutional positions affect legislator behavior. We distinguish two countervailing effects of increased institutional power: shifting priorities and increased capacity. To assess how institutional power shapes behavior, we assemble a massive new database of 611,239 legislator requests to a near census of federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies between 2007 and 2020. We find that legislators prioritize policy work as they gain institutional power (e.g., become a committee chair) but simultaneously maintain their levels of constituency service. Moreover, when a new legislator replaces an experienced legislator, the district receives less constituency service and less policy work. Rather than long-serving and powerful elected officials diverting attention from constituents, their increased capacity enables them to maintain levels of constituency service, even as they prioritize policy work.
2. "Politics and Healthcare Spending in the United States: A Case Study from the Passage of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act" (joint with Zack Cooper, Amanda Kowalski and Jennifer Wu, Journal of Health Economics)
Abstract: This paper analyzes the interplay between congressional politics, the actions of the executive branch, and hospitals’ regulated Medicare payments. We focus on the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) and analyze a provision in the law – Section 508 – that raised certain hospitals’ regulated payments. We show, via our analysis of the Section 508 program, that Medicare payments are malleable and can be influenced by political dynamics. In the cross-section, hospitals represented by members of Congress who voted “yea” on the MMA were more likely to receive Section 508 payment increases. We interviewed the Secretary of Health and Human Services who oversaw the MMA, and he described how these payment increases were designed to win support for the law. The Section 508 payment increases raised hospitals’ activity and spending. Members of Congress representing recipient hospitals received increased campaign contributions after the Section 508 payment increases were extended. Ultimately, our analysis highlights how Medicare payment increases can serve as an appealing tool for legislative leaders working to win votes for wider pieces of legislation.
3. “Legislator Advocacy on Behalf of Constituents and Corporate Donors: A Case Study of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission” (joint with Devin Judge-Lord and Justin Grimmer, in Accountability Reconsidered: Voters, Interests, and Information in US Policymaking.)
Abstract: We examine the relationship among financial contributions to congressional members, constituency interests regarding energy regulation, and congressional oversight of the bureaucracy. We analyze a novel dataset of over 6,000 communications between legislators and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from 2000 to 2018. This analysis suggests that Republican legislators are more likely to write to FERC on behalf of energy companies while Democrats are more likely to write to FERC on behalf of individual constituents, who overwhelmingly oppose energy company interests. The energy sector increasingly funnels campaign contributions primarily to Republican candidates, with Democratic candidates receiving about a third as much as their Republican counterparts. Finally, consistent with the argument that private interests influence congressional oversight, we find a statistically significant positive association between energy sector contributions and pro-business communications by legislators.
4. "Women in Legislative Studies: Improving Gender Equality," (joint with Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and Gisela Sin, PS: Political Science and Politics")
Abstract: Representation of women in the field of legislative politics is remarkably small and the absence of women has wide-ranging ramifications. In Fall 2019, we surveyed 361 women that we identified as studying legislative politics within political science to understand why women’s representation in legislative studies is so low and what we can do about it. We found that many women study legislatures, but they do not always identify as scholars of legislative studies, often do not join the Legislative Studies Section, and tend to prioritize other journals over Legislative Studies Quarterly, the official journal of the section. In this article, we discuss several solutions to the problem of women’s underrepresentation in legislative studies, including the new Women in Legislative Studies initiative.
Abstract: When elected officials gain power, do they use it to provide more constituent service or affect policy? The answer informs debates over how legislator capacity, term limits, and institutional positions affect legislator behavior. We distinguish two countervailing effects of increased institutional power: shifting priorities and increased capacity. To assess how institutional power shapes behavior, we assemble a massive new database of 611,239 legislator requests to a near census of federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies between 2007 and 2020. We find that legislators prioritize policy work as they gain institutional power (e.g., become a committee chair) but simultaneously maintain their levels of constituency service. Moreover, when a new legislator replaces an experienced legislator, the district receives less constituency service and less policy work. Rather than long-serving and powerful elected officials diverting attention from constituents, their increased capacity enables them to maintain levels of constituency service, even as they prioritize policy work.
2. "Politics and Healthcare Spending in the United States: A Case Study from the Passage of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act" (joint with Zack Cooper, Amanda Kowalski and Jennifer Wu, Journal of Health Economics)
Abstract: This paper analyzes the interplay between congressional politics, the actions of the executive branch, and hospitals’ regulated Medicare payments. We focus on the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) and analyze a provision in the law – Section 508 – that raised certain hospitals’ regulated payments. We show, via our analysis of the Section 508 program, that Medicare payments are malleable and can be influenced by political dynamics. In the cross-section, hospitals represented by members of Congress who voted “yea” on the MMA were more likely to receive Section 508 payment increases. We interviewed the Secretary of Health and Human Services who oversaw the MMA, and he described how these payment increases were designed to win support for the law. The Section 508 payment increases raised hospitals’ activity and spending. Members of Congress representing recipient hospitals received increased campaign contributions after the Section 508 payment increases were extended. Ultimately, our analysis highlights how Medicare payment increases can serve as an appealing tool for legislative leaders working to win votes for wider pieces of legislation.
3. “Legislator Advocacy on Behalf of Constituents and Corporate Donors: A Case Study of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission” (joint with Devin Judge-Lord and Justin Grimmer, in Accountability Reconsidered: Voters, Interests, and Information in US Policymaking.)
Abstract: We examine the relationship among financial contributions to congressional members, constituency interests regarding energy regulation, and congressional oversight of the bureaucracy. We analyze a novel dataset of over 6,000 communications between legislators and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from 2000 to 2018. This analysis suggests that Republican legislators are more likely to write to FERC on behalf of energy companies while Democrats are more likely to write to FERC on behalf of individual constituents, who overwhelmingly oppose energy company interests. The energy sector increasingly funnels campaign contributions primarily to Republican candidates, with Democratic candidates receiving about a third as much as their Republican counterparts. Finally, consistent with the argument that private interests influence congressional oversight, we find a statistically significant positive association between energy sector contributions and pro-business communications by legislators.
4. "Women in Legislative Studies: Improving Gender Equality," (joint with Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and Gisela Sin, PS: Political Science and Politics")
Abstract: Representation of women in the field of legislative politics is remarkably small and the absence of women has wide-ranging ramifications. In Fall 2019, we surveyed 361 women that we identified as studying legislative politics within political science to understand why women’s representation in legislative studies is so low and what we can do about it. We found that many women study legislatures, but they do not always identify as scholars of legislative studies, often do not join the Legislative Studies Section, and tend to prioritize other journals over Legislative Studies Quarterly, the official journal of the section. In this article, we discuss several solutions to the problem of women’s underrepresentation in legislative studies, including the new Women in Legislative Studies initiative.